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Introduction: Objective of this Study 
This case study of Merck was completed under a three year research grant from 
the Sloan Foundation. The project's purpose is to examine in a series of case studies how 
U.S. and Japanese firms who are recognized leaders in using information technology to 
achieve long-term sustainable advantage have organized and managed this process. While 
each case is complete in itself, each is part of this larger study.1 
This pharmaceutical industry case together with other cases2 support an initial 
research hypothesis that leading software users in both the U.S. and Japan are very 
sophisticated in the ways they have integrated software into their management strategies 
and use it to institutionalize organizational strengths and capture tacit knowledge on an 
iterative basis. In Japan this strategy has involved heavy reliance on customized and semi-
customized software (Rapp 1995) but is changing towards a more selective use of 
package software managed via customized systems. In turn, U.S. counterparts, such as 
Merck, who have often relied more on packaged software, are doing more customization, 
especially for systems needed to integrate software packages into something more closely 
linked with their business strategies, markets, and organizational structure. Thus, coming 
from different directions, there appears some convergence in approach by these leading 
software users. The cases thus confirm what some other analysts have hypothesized, a 
coherent business strategy is a necessary condition for a successful information technology 
strategy (Wold and Shriver 1993).3 These strategic links for Merck are presented in the 
following case. 
Industries and firms examined are food retailing (Ito-Yokado and H. Butts), semiconductors (NEC and AMD), 
pharmaceuticals (Takeda and Merck), retail banking (Sanwa and Citibank), investment banking (Nomura and Credit 
Suisse First Boston), life insurance (Meiji and USAA), autos (Toyota), steel (mini-mills and integrated mills, Nippon 
Steel, Tokyo Steel and Nucor), and apparel retailing (WalMart). The case writer and the research team wish to 
express their appreciation to the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation for making this work possible and to the Sloan industry 
centers for their invaluable assistance. They especially appreciate the time and guidance given by the center for 
research on pharmaceuticals at MTT as well as Mr. Sato at Takeda. 
This refers to cases for which interviews have been completed. See footnote 3. 
These and other summary results are presented in another Center on Japanese Economy and Business working 
paper: William V. Rapp, "Gaining and Sustaining Long-term Advantage Through Information Technology: The 
Emergence of Controlled Production," December 1998 
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strategy (Wold and Shriver 1993).3 These strategic links for Merck are presented in the 
following case. 
Yet this case along with the other cases also illustrates that implementation and 
design of each company's software and software strategy is unique to its competitive 
situation, industry and strategic objectives. These factors influence how they choose 
between packaged and customized software options for achieving specific goals and how 
they measure their success. Indeed, as part of their strategic integration, Merck and the 
other leading software users interviewed have linked their software strategies with their 
overall management goals through clear mission statements that explicitly note the 
importance of information technology to firm success. 
They have coupled this with active CIO (Chief Information Officer) and IT 
(information technology) support group participation in the firm's business and decision 
making structure. Thus for firms like Merck the totally independent MIS (Management 
Information Systems) department is a thing of the past. This may be one reason why 
outsourcing for them has not been a real option, though their successful business 
performance is not based solely on software. Rather as shall be described below software 
is an integral element of their overall management strategy and plays a key role in serving 
corporate goals such as enhancing productivity, improving inventory management or 
strengthening customer relations. These systems thus must be coupled with an appropriate 
approach to manufacturing, R&D, and marketing reflecting Merck's clear understanding 
of their business, their industry and their firm's competitive strengths within this context. 
This clear business vision has enabled them to select, develop and use the software they 
require for each business function and to integrate these into a total support system for 
their operations to achieve corporate objectives. Since this vision impacts other corporate 
3
 These and other summary results are presented in another Center on Japanese Economy and Business working 
paper: William V. Rapp, "Gaining and Sustaining Long-term Advantage Through Information Technology: The 
Emergence of Controlled Production," December 1998 
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decisions, they have good human resource and financial characteristics too (Appendix I & 
ii). 
Yet Merck does share some common themes with other leading software users 
such as the creation of large proprietary interactive databases that promote automatic 
feedback between various stages and/or players in the production, delivery and 
consumption process. Their ability to use IT to reduce inventories and improve control of 
the production process are also common to other leading software users. They are also 
able organizationally and competitively to build beneficial feedback cycles or loops that 
increase productivity in areas as different as R&D, design and manufacturing while 
reducing cycle times and defects or integrating production and delivery. Improved cycle 
times reduce costs but increase the reliability of forecasts since they need to cover a 
shorter period. Customer satisfaction and lower inventories are improved through on-time 
delivery. Thus, software inputs are critical factors in Merck's and other leading users' 
overall business strategies with strong positive competitive implications for doing it 
successfully and potentially negative implications for competitors. 
An important consideration in this respect is the possible emergence of a new 
strategic manufacturing paradigm in which Merck is probably a leading participant. In the 
same way mass production dramatically improved on craft production through the 
economies of large scale plants that produced and used standardized parts and lean 
production improved on mass production through making the production line more 
continuous, reducing inventories and tying production more closely to actual demand, 
what might be called "controlled" production seems to significantly improve productivity 
through monitoring, controlling and linking every aspect of producing and delivering a 
product or service including after sales service and repair. 
Such controlled production is only possible by actively using information 
technology and software systems to continuously provide the monitoring and control 
function to what had previously been a rather automatic system response to changes in 
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expected or actual consumer demand. This may be why their skillful use of information 
technology is seen by themselves and industry analysts as important to their business 
success, but only when it is integrated with the business from both an operation and 
organization standpoint reflecting their overall business strategy and clarity of competitive 
vision. Therefore at Merck the software and systems development people are part of the 
decision making structure while the system itself is an integral part of organizing, 
delivering and supporting its drug pipeline from R&D through to sales post FDA 
approval. This sequence is particularly critical in pharmaceuticals where even after clinical 
trials there is a continuous need to monitor potential side effects. 
Therefore Seagate Technology may be correct for Merck too when they state in 
their 1997 Annual Report "We are experiencing a new industrial revolution, one more 
powerful than any before it. In this emerging digital world of the Third Millennium, 
the new currency will be information. How we harness it will mean the difference 
between success and failure, between having competitive advantage and being an 
also-ran." 
In Merck's case, as with the other leading software users examined, the key to 
using software successfully is to develop a mix of packaged and customized software that 
supports their business strategies and differentiates them from competitors. However, they 
have not tried to adapt their organizational structure to the software. Given this 
perspective, functional and market gains have justified the additional expense incurred 
through customization, including the related costs of integrating customized and packaged 
software into a single information system. They do this by assessing the possible business 
uses of software organizationally and operationally and especially its role in enhancing 
their core competencies. While they will use systems used by competitors if there is no 
business advantage to developing their own, they reject the view that information systems 
6 
are generic products best developed by outside vendors who can achieve low cost through 
economies of scale and who can more easily afford to invest in the latest technologies.4 
In undertaking this and the other case studies, the project team sought to answer 
certain key questions while still recognizing firm, country and industry differences. These 
have been explained in the summary paper referenced in footnote 3. We have set them 
forth in Appendix I where Merck's profile is presented based on our interviews and other 
research. Readers who wish to assess for themselves the way Merck's strategies and 
approaches to using information technology address these issues may wish to review 
Appendix I prior to reading the case. For others it may be a useful summary. 5 
Merck and the other cases have been developed using a common methodology that examines cross national pairs of 
firms in key industries. In principle, each pair of case studies focuses on a Japanese and American firm in an industry 
where software is a significant and successful input into competitive performance. The firms examined are ones 
recognized by the Sloan industry centers and by the industry as ones using software successfully . To develop the 
studies, we combined analysis of existing research results with questionnaires and direct interviews. Further, to relate 
these materials to previous work as well as the expertise located in each industry center, we held working meetings 
with each center and coupled new questionnaires with the materials used in the previous study to either update or 
obtain a questionnaire similar to the one used in the 1993-95 research (Rapp 1995). This method enabled us to relate 
each candidate and industry to earlier results. We also worked with the industry centers to develop a set of questions 
that specifically relate to a firm's business strategy and software's role within that. Some questions address issues 
that appear relatively general across industries such as inventory control. Others such as managing the drug pipeline 
are more specific to a particular industry. The focus has been to establish the firm's perception of its industry and its 
competitive position as well as its advantage in developing and using a software strategy. The team also contacted 
customers, competitors, and industry analysts to determine whether competitive benefits or impacts perceived by the 
firm were recognized outside the organization. These sources provided additional data on measures of 
competitiveness as well as industry strategies and structure. The case studies are thus based on extensive interviews 
by the project team on software's use and integration into management strategies to improve competitiveness in 
specific industries, augmenting existing data on industry dynamics, firm organizational structure and management 
strategy collected from the Sloan industry enters. In addition, we gathered data from outside sources and firms or 
organizations with which we worked in the earlier project. Finally, the US and Japanese companies in each industry 
that were selected on the basis of being perceived as successfully using software in a key role in their competitive 
strategies in fact saw their use of software in this exact manner while these competitive benefits were generally 
confirmed after further research. 
The questions are broken into the following categories: General Management and Corporate Strategy, Industry 
Related Issues, Competition, Country Related Issues, IT Strategy, IT Operations, Human Resources and Organization, 
Various Metrics such as Inventory Control, Cycle Times and Cost Reduction, and finally some Conclusions and 
Results. They cover a range of issues from direct use of software to achieve competitive advantage, to corporate 
strategy, to criteria for selecting software, to industry economics, to measures of success, to organizational 
integration, to beneficial loops, to training and institutional dynamics, and finally to interindustry comparisons. 
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The Pharmaceutical Industry in a Global Context 
In advanced countries that represent Merck's primary market, the pharmaceutical 
industry is an exceptionally research intensive industry where many firms are large 
multinationals (MNCs). It is also heavily regulated for both local producers and MNCs. 
Regulations work as both constraints and performance boosters since drugs are used with 
other medical and healthcare services. Therefore, healthcare expenditures are divided 
among many industries and providers of which pharmaceuticals are only one. All parties 
involved are interested in influencing the regulatory environment and in participating in the 
growth in healthcare services. This means understanding the industry requires appreciating 
its political economic context. In this regard, healthcare providers in rich nations are 
currently under pressure to control costs due to aging populations. Regulators who have 
the authority to change the demand structure through laws and regulations are considering 
various measures to reduce costs such as generic drug substitution which may mean lower 
returns for discovering and developing drugs. Still, if drugs are more effective at reducing 
healthcare costs compared to other treatments, Pharmaceutical companies can benefit. 
Since R&D is at the heart of competition, each drug company must respond to these cost 
containment pressures cautiously and strategically in competing for healthcare 
expenditures. 
Another important aspect of this industry is technological change arising from the 
convergence of life and biological sciences. Many disciplines now work together to 
uncover the mechanisms that lie behind our bodies and various diseases. Examples are 
molecular biology, cell biology, biophysics, genetics, evolutionary biology, and 
bioinformatics. As scientists see life from these new chemical and physical viewpoints, the 
ability to represent, process and organize the massive data based on these theories 
becomes critical. Because computers are very flexible scientific instruments (Rosenberg 
1994), progress in information technology and computer science has broadened scientific 
frontiers for the life and biological sciences. These advances have opened new doors to 
8 
attack more complex diseases, including some chronic diseases of old age. These 
therapeutic areas are present opportunities for pharmaceutical companies since they 
address demographic and technical changes in advanced countries. Still, to take advantage 
of these opportunities requires information technology capabilities. 
Historically, the drug industry has been relatively stable where the big players have 
remained unchanged for years. This has been due to various entry barriers such as R&D 
costs, advertising expense, and strong expertise in managing clinical trials. It is difficult 
and expensive for a new company to acquire this combination of skills quickly. However, 
there are signs the industry and required mix of skills may be changing. There have been 
several cross national mergers especially between U.S. and European companies. In 
addition, new biotechnology companies are very good at basic research, which may force 
pharmaceutical R&D to transform itself. For example, no single company even among the 
new mega-companies is large enough to cover all new areas of expertise and therapeutic 
initiatives. Thus, many competitors have had to form strategic alliances to learn or access 
new technologies and to capture new markets. Conversely, a stand-alone company can 
have a lot to lose. The challenge facing large pharmaceutical companies is how fast and 
how effectively they can move to foster both technological innovation and cost 
containment without exposing themselves to too much risk. 
The pharmaceutical industry in all of Merck's major markets reflects these cost 
containment pressures, the need to harmonize expensive and time consuming clinical trials, 
and the impact of extensive regulations. Information technology has had its impacts too. 
For example, to respond to these challenges Merck is using more management techniques 
based on consensus decision making among top functional managers. This requires better 
communication support using e-mail and groupware combined with face-to-face 
communication. This is part of an industry trend towards greater parallel decision making 
in R&D and less sequential decision making where A must first concur on a project before 
moving to B, etc Now all elements of the firm evaluate the project simultaneously at each 
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stage. In this manner, Merck has significantly reduced coordination costs while 
centralizing and speeding the overall decision making process. Additionally, first-tier 
firms have had to follow a trend in R&D strategies that increasingly use information 
technologies. Exchange of data and ideas across national borders has become relatively 
easy, and contracts may specify access to another company's database. Because many 
companies share similar R&D instruments and methods, one company's instruments may 
be compatible with other companies'. Indeed, the trend towards greater use of Web-based 
technology in R&D and other operations may change our notion of a firm and its 
boundaries. Firms may eventually be characterized by knowledge creating capabilities 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi 1995). Having more ways to communicate with other companies 
makes frequent communication with greater nuance possible. This supports the trend 
towards more strategic alliances unless overtaken by the creation of larger firms through 
continued mergers. 
This is also partially due to the nature of the industry which is part of the fine 
chemical industry where changes in technologies are rapid and often discontinuous. It 
therefore requires different management skills from other technology based industries, 
especially as the knowledge required for innovation tends to be more specialized thus 
demanding less coordination than assembly industries. Transferring mass production 
know-how to R&D is also limited. Still, the U.S. and European industries have been 
undergoing massive reorganization to achieve economies of scope and scale in R&D and 
marketing where firms are taking advantage of the fact that the U.S. industry is much less 
regulated than most foreign industries (Bogner and Thomas 1996). 
The U.S. companies grew after World War II due to a huge home market 
combined with the global market for antibiotics this was before British firms began to 
recapture market share. At that time, European firms did not have the resources to sell 
drugs directly to U.S. doctors. The European recovery period gave U.S. firms enough 
time to take advantage of antibiotics. Then, when the U.S. market became saturated, U.S. 
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firms expanded into global markets in the early 1960s. This forced U.S. firms to diversify 
their R&D as well. At the same time, in 1962 amendments to the Food, Drug and 
Cosmetic Act increased the rigor of drug regulation creating an entry barrier to industry 
R&D that favored large established firms (Bogner and Thomas 1996). The U.S. effectively 
tightened their regulations after their industry had acquired sufficient R&D skills and 
resources. This timing seems to account for today's industry success. Another factor is 
that unlike the European industry, U.S. firms had few incentives to integrate vertically. 
During the War the military distributed antibiotics. Therefore, the U.S. firms were 
generally bulk chemical producers such as Merck and Phizer or sellers of branded drugs 
such as Abbott and Upjohn. At the end of the War, only a few firms such as Squibb were 
fully integrated. However, as promotion and other downstream functions became more 
critical, controlling functions such as distribution became a strategic objective. To 
accomplish this they acquired other firms (Merck acquired Sharpe and Dohine and Phizer 
acquired Roerig), developing expansion via merger and acquisition as a business strategy 
and core competency. This helped lay the foundation for subsequent industry 
consolidation. 
Today, American healthcare is based on the belief that while making progress in 
science is the best way to solve medical problems, cost containment is also important. As a 
result, while American healthcare is the most expensive in the world, it is also not available 
to everyone and is the most subject to cost scrutiny. Indeed, since drugs are just one way 
to improve health, consumers should want to remain healthy and choose cost effective 
means to do this. However, the reality is that insurance systems covering different services 
give incentives and disincentives for particular care (Schweitzer 1997). Thus, coordinated 
adjustment of prices for healthcare is necessary to get markets for healthcare products to 
work better. In the U.S., this has led to a public policy push for HMOs. These healthcare 
purchasers have in turn set the reward schemes available to healthcare providers such as 
pharmaceutical companies so as to reduce transaction costs (Ikegami and Campbell 1996) 
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and promote innovation. These developments and trends are putting more pressure on 
major firms to put more resources into R&D, to focus more critically on just ethical drug 
development for the global market, and to be more careful in gathering information on 
clinical trials and side effects. 
The most important market for Merck in this regard is the U.S. where NTH has 
pursued a unified approach. This is because the NIH (The National Institutes of Health) 
has actively supported basic life science research in U.S. universities, especially after 
World War II. NSF (National Science Foundation) also encouraged collaboration between 
academia and industry with partial funding by the government. Other federal and state 
funding has been important to the scientific community as well, especially in 
biotechnology. In biotechnology, the funding of basic research has led to a complex 
pattern of university-industry interaction that includes gene patenting and the immediate 
publishing of results (Rabinow 1996). U.S. drug companies are of course profit motivated 
but are regulated by the FDA (Federal Drug Administration) which is rigorous about its 
drug approvals, demanding clear scientific evidence in clinical research as its operation is 
basically science oriented. 
Product R&D and Clinical Trials 
Still, despite this R&D support, industry economics are driven by pharmaceutical 
R&D's very lengthy process, composed of discovering, developing and bringing to market 
new ethical drugs with the latter heavily determined by the drug approval process in major 
markets such as the U.S., Europe and Japan6. These new therapeutic ethical products fall 
into four broad categories (U.S. Congress, OTA 1993): one, new chemical entities 
(NCEs) - new therapeutic entities (NTEs) - new therapeutic molecular compounds never 
before used or tested in humans; two, drug delivery mechanisms - new approaches to 
delivering therapeutic agents at the desired dose to the desired part of the body; three, 
6
 Ethical drugs are biological and medicinal chemicals advertised and promoted primarily to the medical, pharmacy, 
and allied professions. Ethical drugs include products available only by prescription as well as some over-the-counter 
drugs (Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association 1970-1991). 
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next stage products - new combinations, formulations, dosing forms, or dosing strengths 
of existing compounds that must be tested in humans before market introduction; four, 
generic products - copies of drugs not protected by patents or other exclusive marketing 
rights. 
From the viewpoint of major pharmaceutical firms such as Merck, NCEs are the 
most important for the R&D of innovative drugs that drive industry success. Since it is a 
risky and very expensive process, understanding a company's R&D and drug approval 
process is critical to understanding the firm's strategy and competitiveness both 
domestically and globally. Statistics indicate that only about 1 in 60,000 compounds 
synthesized by laboratories can be regarded as "highly successful" (U.S. Congress, OTA 
1993). Thus, it is very important to stop the R&D process whenever one recognizes 
success is not likely. Chemists and biologists used to decide which drugs to pursue, but 
R&D is now more systematic and is a collective company decision since it can involve 
expenditures of $250 to $350 million prior to market launch, thus the need for more 
parallel decision making. Key factors in the decision making process are expected costs 
and returns, the behavior of competitors, liability concerns, and possible future 
government policy changes (Schweitzer 1997). Therefore, stage reviews during drug 
R&D are common, and past experiences in development, manufacturing, regulatory 
approvals, and marketing can provide ample guidance. 
NCE's are discovered either through screening existing compounds or designing 
new molecules. Once synthesized, they go through a rigorous testing process. Their 
pharmacological activity, therapeutic promise, and toxicity are tested using isolated cell 
cultures and animals as well as computer models. It is then modified to a related 
compound to optimize its pharmacological activity with fewer undesirable biological 
properties (U.S. Congress, OTA 1993). Once preclinical studies are completed and the 
NCE has been proven safe on animals, the drug sponsor applies for Investigational New 
Drug (IND) status. If it receives approval, it starts Phase I clinical trials to establish the 
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tolerance of healthy human subjects at different doses to study pharmacological effects on 
humans in anticipated dosage levels. It also studies its absorption, distribution, 
metabolism, and excretion patterns. This stage requires careful supervision since one does 
not know if the drug is safe on humans. 
During phase II clinical trials a relatively small number of patients participate in 
controlled trials of the compound's potential usefulness and short term risks. Phase III 
trials gather precise information on the drug's effectiveness for specific indications, 
determine whether it produces a broader range of adverse effects than those exhibited in 
the smaller phase I and II trials. Phase III trials can involve several hundred to several 
thousand subjects and are extremely expensive. Stage reviews occur before and during 
each phase, and drug development may be terminated at any point in the pipeline if the risk 
of failure and the added cost needed to prove effectiveness outweigh the weighted 
probability of success. 
There is a data and safety monitoring board in the U.S.. This group has access to 
"unblinded data" throughout the conduct of a trial but does not let anyone else know what 
the data shows until it is necessary. For example, they will not divulge the efficacy data 
until the trial reaches a point where it seems appropriate to recommend stopping it 
because the null hypothesis of efficacy has been accepted or rejected. The FDA will 
usually insist on the drug proving efficacy with respect to ameliorating a disease before 
giving approval. 
If clinical trials are successful, the sponsor seeks FDA marketing approval by 
submitting a New Drug Application (NDA). If approved, the drug can be marketed 
immediately, though the FDA often requires some amendments before marketing can 
proceed (Schweitzer 1997). However, successful drug development and sales not only 
requires approval of therapeutic value and validity but also that the manufacturing process 
meet stringent "best-practice" standards. To meet U.S. regulations, Phase IV trials are 
required. Manufacturers selling drugs must notify the FDA periodically about the 
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performance of their products. This surveillance is designed to detect uncommon, yet 
serious, adverse reactions typically not revealed during premarket testing. This 
postapproval process is especially important when phase III trials were completed under 
smaller fast track reviews. These additional studies usually include use by children or by 
those using multiple drugs where potential interactions can be important (Schweitzer 
1997). Furthermore, because drug development costs are so high relative to production 
costs, patent protection is another key aspect of a company's management strategy. Under 
U.S. law, one must apply for a patent within one year of developing an NCE or the 
innovation enters the public domain. Therefore, patenting is usually early in the 
development cycle or prior to filing the NCE. But as this begins the patent life, shortening 
the approval period extends a drug's effective revenue life under patent. This makes 
managing clinical trials and the approval process an important strategic variable. 
Although creating a drug pipeline through various stages of development is 
relatively standardized, it is changing as companies use different methods to reduce time 
and related costs of new drug development. Companies are constantly pressuring the 
authorities to reduce NDA review times. As a consequence, the FDA did introduce an 
accelerated approval process for new drugs in oncology, HIV (AIDS) and other life 
threatening illnesses. A familiar feature of this new fast track review is the use of surrogate 
end points, or proxies for clinical end points which are measured by laboratory values but 
lack supporting clinical outcomes data. 
Accelerated approval speeds new drugs to market saving companies tens of 
millions of dollars in negative cash flow. However, it does not generate clinical values that 
insurers and managed care organizations demand. Countering this situation is thus the 
trend among drug firms to increase the complexity of their analyses during clinical trials. 
Companies have begun to use cost-effective analysis in their evaluation of new drugs in 
assessing competing product development investment alternatives and by integrating cost 
effectiveness analysis into their clinical trials. They also try to capture quality of life 
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measures such as how patients perceive their lives while using the new drug. Companies 
vary their analysis by country (Rettig 1997) since measures of effectiveness shift according 
to clinical practice, accessibility to doctors, and what different cultures value as important. 
There are no universal measures of the quality of life. At present, the components 
measured depend largely on the objectives of each researcher but some companies are 
trying to introduce more systematic measures. Nevertheless, no matter what components 
are chosen for these studies, capturing, storing and using the data requires sophisticated 
software and data base management techniques which must be correlated with various 
families of molecules. Also, to avoid the moral hazard of focusing on the weaknesses in a 
competitor's drug or molecule, some analysts argue companies should examine all 
domains and their components (Spilker 1996) and move towards agreed performance 
standards. Furthermore, quality of life measures should only be used when they are of 
practical use to doctors in treating patients (Levine 1996). Such judgments should be 
sensitive and informed and should cover criteria related and important to a broad spectrum 
of patients while balancing measures which can be easily gathered and those that are more 
complex due to multiple treatments. These trends make clinical trials and data gathering 
complex and expensive and put a premium on a firm's ability to manage the process 
efficiently, including creating and using large patient and treatment databases. 
Manufacturing and Process R&D 
The research process differs from production. Yet, both are important, particularly 
the firm's knowledge of scale-up. This is difficult because production requires uniformity 
at every stage. Making the average chemical make-up constant is not enough. Careful 
scale-up is essential to avoid contamination. Variations from the mean in commercial 
production must be very small. This requires constant control of variables such as the 
preparation of raw materials, solvents, reaction conditions, and yields. Often, experience 
will help achieve purer output in the intermediate processes. This better output alleviates 
problems in later processes. Thus, there is a learning curve in process R&D which starts at 
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the laboratory. An important distinction is between continuous process and batch process. 
In the continuous process, raw materials and sub-raw materials go into a flow process that 
produces output continuously. This continuous process is more difficult because many 
parameters and conditions have to be kept constant. This requires a good understanding of 
both optimizing the chemical process and maintaining safeguards against abnormal 
conditions. However, continuous processes are less dangerous and require fewer people to 
control at the site than batch processing where the chemicals are produced in batches, put 
in pill form and then stored for future distribution and sale (Takeda 1992). 
The following compares initial process R&D once a compound is discovered and 
commercial manufacturing for a representative chemical entity proceeds (Pisano 1996). 
Comparison research process and commercial production for representative chemical 
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Process R&D in chemical pharmaceuticals involves three stages: (1) process 
research, where basic process chemistry (synthetic route) is explored and chosen; (2) pilot 
development, where the process is run and refined in an intermediate-scale pilot plant; and 
(3) technology transfer and startup, where process is run at a commercial manufacturing 
site (Pisano 1997). Pisano argues that the scientific base of chemistry is more mature than 
biotechnology and this difference accounts for the more extensive use of computer 
simulations in drugs made by chemical synthesis than biotechnology-based drugs. 
Codifying the knowledge in chemistry and chemical engineering in software has a 
higher explanatory power than in biotechnology. In chemistry, many scientific laws are 
available for process variables such as pressure, volume, and temperature. Computer 
models can simulate these in response to given parameters to predict cost, throughput and 
yield (Pisano 1997). By contrast, biotechnology has aspects that resemble art dependent 
on an opprator's skill more than science which only requires the proper formulation. This 
is particularly true for large-scale biotechnology process (Pisano 1997). Simulation is thus 
less reliably extrapolated to commercial production. An additional factor is the importance 
of purification after large-scale production in bioreactors in biotechnology-based drugs. It 
is not rare at this stage of extraction and purification that commercial application becomes 
impossible, even though the scale-up is successful. Since avoiding contamination is the key 
in biotechnology-based drugs, extracting and purifying a small amount of the desired 
materials from a large amount of broth is critical. This process is done using filters, 
chromatography, and other methods specific to organisms (Koide 1994). 
Technological Factors 
All scientific frontiers affect pharmaceutical companies. Since no company can be 
an expert on everything, what technology to develop in-house and what to license or 
subcontract have become important issues. In general, pharmaceutical companies were 
skeptical of new developments in small biotechnology firms. Yet the latter now provide 
new techniques in basic research and fermentation to the MNCs. Other pharmaceutical 
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companies then tend to follow when competitors adopt ideas from less well known 
biotech companies. This is why many such companies announce platform deals with drug 
companies to get more financial resources and opportunities. Biotechnology based 
pharmaceuticals have entered a new development stage which requires the capital, 
manufacturing and marketing expertise of the large companies. 
New drug discovery methods and biotechnology each demand skills different from 
earlier times. Emerging biotech companies offer new ideas and research tools. Other new 
technologies such as stripping out side effects, specialized drug delivery systems, and 
"antisense" which cancels out the disease causing messages of faulty RNA also come from 
biotechnology (Fortune 1997). These are promising areas of drug research and potential 
products. Further, these biotech companies develop new drugs more quickly than large 
firms. Where they often have difficulty is in managing clinical trials and the approval 
process, an area where large firms have considerable experience and expertise, including 
sophisticated software for tracking the large data bases and handling the new 
computerized application procedure. In addition, biotechnology demands skills in large 
scale commercial production which smaller startups may not possess. Thus, close 
association with large firms is logical and efficient, and one should expect more future 
alliances and joint ventures, though outsourcing to organizations that will manage clinical 
trials is growing. 
Another important factor which further encourages specialization in a network of 
companies is the industry's heavy use of information technology. Indeed, software 
strategies have become an important part of the industry through their impact on R&D, 
drug approval, including clinical trials, and control of manufacturing. If decisions in a 
science based industry are generally driven by knowledge creation capability dependent on 
human resources, having information sharing and access mechanisms so complementary 
capabilities can be efficiently exchanged and used becomes key to successful corporate 
strategy, especially when that knowledge is growing and becoming increasingly diverse. 
19 
There is some evidence suggesting when innovation is dependent on trial and error, it is 
best done when many players try different strategies and are held responsible for the 
projects they choose (Columbia Engineering Conference on Quality September 1997). 
If the large drug companies can successfully form principal-agent relationships 
with biotechnology companies doing advanced research in a particular area in the same 
way that Japanese parts manufacturers have with large assemblers, there may be 
opportunities for major breakthroughs without the drug companies having to put such trial 
and error processes inside the company where they may be less easy to manage. If the 
make or buy decision in a science based industry is generally driven by knowledge creation 
capability dependent on human resources, the basis for new product, i.e. drug 
development, becomes more dependent on the nature and facility of information exchange 
between groups and individuals than asset ownership. Creating information sharing and 
access mechanisms so that complementary capabilities can be efficiently exchanged and 
used then becomes the key to successful corporate strategy in knowledge based industries, 
especially when that knowledge base is growing and becoming increasingly diverse as in 
the ethical drug industry. 
Another information sharing issue related to biotech is pharmacology. Classical 
pharmacology models are often irrelevant for biotech-based drugs. While some proteins 
express their activities across other species, others can be more species specific. Neither 
poor results nor good animal trial results need be predictive for humans. Particularly 
difficult problems are those related to toxicology since some animals develop neutralizing 
antibodies (Harris 1997). Technical support systems are important in biotechnology as 
well. One is transgenic animals. They provide information on the contribution of particular 
genes to a disease. This is done by inserting genes that have the function of expressing the 
phenotype, or interbreeding heterozygotic animals to produce "knockout animals" that 
suffer from inherited metabolic diseases. Transgenic animals are relevant to early phase 
clinical trials since the data from these animals contribute useful data on dose-selection 
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and therapeutic rations in human studies. In addition, they offer hints to which variables 
are secondary. This simplifies the clinical trial design. In general, significant input in the 
design and running of phase I and II trials must come from the bench scientists who built 
the molecule (Harris 1997). Since clinical trials for biotech drugs lack clear guidelines, in-
house communication among drug discovery, preclinical and clinical trials is important, 
especially due to the increased use of transgenic animals bred to examine inherited 
diseases. This process in phase I/II trials can be greatly facilitated by information sharing 
technologies and acts as another driver towards a more integrated approach to decision 
making using IT. 
Structure-Based Drug ("Rational Drug") Design 
This is also true of structure-based drug ("rational drug") design or molecular 
modeling which is a range of computerized techniques based on theoretical chemistry 
methods and experimental data used either to analyze molecules and molecular systems or 
to predict molecular and biological properties (Cohen 1996). Traditional methods of drug 
discovery consist of taking a lead structure and developing a chemical program for finding 
analog molecules exhibiting the desired biological properties in a systematic way. The 
initial compounds were found by chance or random screening. This process involved 
several trial and error cycles developed by medicinal chemists using their intuition to select 
a candidate analog for further development. This traditional method has been 
supplemented by structure-based drug design (Cohen 1996) which tries to use the 
molecular targets involved in a disorder. The relationship between a drug and its receptor 
is complex and not completely known. The structure-based ligand design attempts to 
create a drug that has a good fit with the receptor. This fit is optimized by minimizing the 
energies of interaction. But, this determination of optimum interaction energy of a ligand 
in a known receptor site remains difficult. Computer models permit manipulations such as 
superposition and energy calculation that are difficult with mechanical models. They also 
provide an exhaustive way to analyze molecules and to save and store this data for later 
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use or after a research chemist has left. However, models must still be tested and used and 
eventually, chemical intuition is required to analyze the data (Gund 1996). Then the drug 
must proceed through animal and clinical trials. 
Still the idea behind this modeling is the principle that a molecule's biological 
properties are related to its structure. This reflects a better understanding in the 1970s of 
biochemistry. So rational drug design has also benefited from biotechnology. In the 1970s 
and 1980s, drug discovery was still grounded in organic chemistry. Now rational drug 
design provides customized drug design synthesized specifically to activate or inactivate 
particular physiological mechanisms. This technique is most useful in particular therapeutic 
areas. For example, histamine receptor knowledge was an area where firms first took 
advantage of rational design since its underlying mechanism was understood early (Bogner 
and Thomas 1996). The starting point is the molecular target in the body. So one is 
working from demand rather than finding a use for a new molecule. 
The scientific concepts behind this approach have been available for a long time. 
The existence of receptors and the lock-and-key concepts currently considered in drug 
design were formulated by P. Ehrlich (1909) and E. Fischer (1894). Its subtleties were 
understood, though, only in the 1970s with the use of X-ray crystallography to reveal 
molecular architecture of isolated pure samples of protein targets (Cohen 1996). The first 
generation of this technology conceived in the 1970s considered molecules as two 
topological dimensional entities. In 1980s it was used together with quantitative structure-
activity relationships (QSAR) concepts. The first generation of this technology has proven 
to be useful only for the optimization of a given series (Cohen 1996). The second 
generation of rational drug design has considered the full detailed property of molecules in 
the three dimensional (3-D) formula. This difference is significant, since numerical 
parameters in the QSAR approaches do not tell the full story about the interaction 
between a ligand and a protein (Cohen 1996). 
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This has been facilitated by software and hardware becoming less costly. Thus 
many scientists are paying attention to computational techniques that are easier to use than 
mechanical models. This underscores the role of instrumentation in scientific research 
stressed by Rosenberg (1994). Availability of new instruments, including computers, has 
opened new opportunities in technological applications and furthered research in new 
directions. Three dimensional graphics particularly suits the needs of a multi-disciplinary 
team since everyone has different chemical intuition but appreciates the 3-D image. 
Rosenberg (1994) notes scientists who move across disciplines bring those concepts and 
tools to another scientific discipline such as from physics to biology and chemistry. This 
suggests the importance of sharing instruments, particularly computer images and 
databases that help people work and think together. 
The predominant systems of molecular modeling calculations are UNIX 
workstations, particularly three dimensional graphics workstations such as those from 
Silicon Graphics. But other hardware such as desktop Macintoshes and MS-DOS personal 
computers on the low end and computer servers and supercomputers on the high end have 
been used. Computational power is required for more complex calculations and this guides 
the choice of hardware. A variety of commercial software packages are available from 
$50-$5,000 for PC-based systems to $100,000 or more for supercomputers. Universities, 
research institutes, and commercial laboratories develop these packages. Still, no one 
system meets all the molecular modeler's needs. The industry therefore desperately needs 
an open, high-level programming environment allowing various applications to work 
together (Gund 1996). This means those who for strategic reasons want to take advantage 
of this technology must now do their own software development. This is the competitive 
software compulsion facing many drug producers. In turn, the better they can select 
systems, develop their capabilities, and manage their use, the more successful they will be 
in drug development and in managing other aspects of the drug pipeline. 
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The choice of hardware is based on software availability and the performance 
criteria needed to run it. Current major constraints are the power of graphics programs 
and the way the chemist interacts with the data and its representation (Hubbard 1996). 
Apple computers have frequently been used in R&D because of superior graphics, though 
this edge may be eroded by new PCs using Pentium MMX as well as moves to more open 
systems. However, Dr. Popper, Merck's CIO, feels that the real issue, is the software 
packages for the MAC that research scientists know and rely on but that are not yet 
available for Windows NT. Thus, MACs continue to be used for Medical R&D which 
keeps the Windows market from developing. There are, in addition, the elements of 
inertia, emotional attachment and training which are apparent at major medical schools 
too. 
In sum, rational design has opened a wide range of new research based on a firm's 
understanding of biochemical mechanisms. This means tremendous opportunities to enter 
new therapeutic areas. However, since rational design is very expensive, it has raised entry 
costs and the minimum effective size for pharmaceutical firms by putting a premium on 
those with a sequence of cash generating drugs. It also has favored firms with broader 
product lines able to spread the costs of equipment over many projects and to transfer 
knowledge across therapeutic areas, contributing to the increased cost of new drugs 
through higher R&D and systems support spending (Bogner and Thomas 1996). 
A similar analysis applies to the use of other new technologies because major U.S. 
and Japanese companies to discover and develop drugs systematically, such as 
combinatorial chemistry, robotic high-throughput screening, advances in medical genetics, 
and bioinformatics. These technologies affect not only R&D but also the organization and 
the way they deal with other organizations as many new technologies are complementary. 
For example, high-throughput screening automates the screening process to identify 
compounds for further testing or to optimize the lead compound. Thus, both regulatory 
and technological change have raised the advantage of developing innovative drugs, even 
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though it is inherently risky and forces firms to develop better skills in using information 
technology to support the process. 
The Pharmaceutical Industry in the United States 
As explained above, healthcare and the pharmaceutical industry are closely 
intertwined, especially in the U.S.. Ever since the election of the Clinton Administration, 
U.S. healthcare has been the focus of heated debate. The pricing of pharmaceuticals in 
particular is one of the most controversial aspects of the industry. Estimates of the cost of 
bringing a new drug to market are up to over $250 million (DiMasi et. al. 1991). 
However, once drugs are on the market, the costs of manufacturing, marketing and 
distribution are relatively small. This loose connection between marginal cost and the 
market price seems to require further justification for drug pricing. 
While the obvious answer lies in the high fixed cost of drug development and the 
expensive and time consuming approval process prior to any positive cash flow, the 
answer is still not easy. Furthermore, the drug market is very complex for several reasons. 
First, there are many drug classes for which only a few products exist. Secondly, FDVIOs 
(health maintenance organizations) and other managed-care plans can negotiate substantial 
discounts because they are able to control the prescription decisions made by their 
participating physicians and because they buy in large quantities. These health 
organizations are highly price sensitive. This means drug prices are substantially 
determined by the purchaser's demand elasticity. This demand in turn determines 
investment decisions (Schweitzer 1997). Thirdly, the market for pharmaceuticals is highly 
segmented, both domestically and internationally, and price discrimination between and 
within national markets is common. Research studies cannot even agree on a common 
measure of wholesale price. Indeed, no measure captures actual transaction prices, 
including discounts and rebates (Schweitzer 1997). Fourth, consumers do not have 
enough scientific knowledge to assess different drugs. Thus, gatekeepers such as doctors 
are important (Hirsch 1975). 
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Yet, the current trend is towards managed care and HMOs who closely control 
costs. This development clearly indicates physicians are losing some autonomy in drug 
selection. Thus it is not surprising the market share of generic drugs has increased from 
15% to over 41% between 1983 and 1996. This has forced the ethical drug manufacturers 
to communicate both more effectively with the HMOs and managed care organizations in 
addition to physicians and to demonstrate the improved efficacy of their products as 
compared with generics. The acquisition of PBMs (pharmacy benefit managers) by 
pharmaceutical companies is an important development in this regard. Physicians now 
have to prescribe drugs available in the formularies of the managed-care organization. 
PBMs suggest cheaper alternatives to physicians for a given therapeutic benefit to save 
money. Eighty percent of the 100 million patient/member PBM market as of 1993 is 
controlled by the five big PBMs (Schweitzer 1997). In turn, when PBMs and mail-order 
companies expand, the small pharmacies lose the data necessary to examine various drug 
interactions. Since current U.S. law protects the propriety data of pharmacists and 
pharmacy chains, information on prescription for those patients who use pharmacies and 
mail-order companies actually becomes fragmented. It is likely this development could 
affect pharmacists' jobs as well. 
A fifth reason is FDA approval does not mean new drugs are better than old ones. 
As noted above, this has pressured drug companies to prove the effectiveness in cost and 
quality of life their drugs bring to patients. Recently, drug companies have often tried to 
show how their drugs can help patients restore a normal quality of life. As already 
described, these concerns complicate the design of clinical trials. Consolidation among 
wholesalers, the greater complexity of clinical trials and globalization favor firms with 
substantial resources and are part of the reason for the industry's merger trend, especially 
between U.S. and European companies. The leading pharmaceutical firms ranked by 1994 
sales are as follows (Scrip Magazine, Jan. 1996), with five of them the result of cross 
border mergers. Merck ranks 2d: 
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*3: Comparison is based on U.S. dollars 
*4: Calculation based on the sales of companies before mergers 
*5: Including OTC (over the counter drugs) 
*6: Excludes sales through strategic alliances 
Merck 
Merck is a multibillion dollar pharmaceutical firm with a long history going back to 
the 19th century in the U.S. and the 17th century in Germany. While in the past they have 
diversified into areas like animal health care, they are now very focused almost exclusively 
on human health, in particular, on ethical branded prescription drugs within human health 
care since they have found this is their most profitable business area. Also, given the many 
opportunities that exist, it will demand all their capital and energy for the foreseeable 
future. It has therefore spun off its animal health care business to a joint venture and sold 
its specialty chemical business. This strategy and motivation is similar to Takeda's focus 
on human health, whose market is more lucrative than its other businesses. The company 
appears to stress their ability to bring innovative drugs to market. Merck briefly tried to 
produce generic versions of their drugs, but found it was not worth the investment. In 
addition, they now assume someone else will produce their OTC (over the counter) 
versions too. This strategic focus is now underscored by their active formation of strategic 
alliances. 
For example, in the OTC medicine market in the U.S. and Europe, but not in 
Japan, Merck relies on Johnson & Johnson through a joint venture with J&J to market, 
distribute and sell the OTC versions of Merck's prescription drugs. This means Merck has 
seen the OTC market as one way to lengthen the revenue stream for some of its products 
after their patents expire. In Japan, Merck's agreement is with Chugai Pharmaceutical Co. 
Ltd. They formed a joint venture in September 1996 to develop and market Merck's OTC 
medicines there (Merck 1996 Annual Report). Moreover, Merck and Rhone-Poulenc have 
announced plans to combine their animal health and poultry genetics businesses to form 
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Merial, a new company that will be the world's largest in animal health and poultry 
genetics (Merck 1996 Annual Report). 
Their primary strategic focus on ethical drugs seems appropriate, but as explained 
above it is also critical with respect to this strategy that they maintain relationships with 
those in scientifically related fields. Their work with Rhone-Poulenc must be examined in 
this light since improving their competence in the genetic business seems a good part of 
their strategy given developments in biotechnology and the Human Genome Project. This 
is because biotechnology-related drugs are often species-specific (Harris 1997). More 
knowledge about the genetic make-up of human and animal bodies may provide some 
insights into the appropriate choice of animals in pre-clinical trials from which to 
extrapolate observations to humans. Since this extrapolation is never perfect and you have 
to do animal experiments anyway, they have added to their competence in genetics via a 
joint venture with Du Pont called Du Pont-Merck Pharmaceuticals Co, whose investors 
are E.I. Du Pont (50%) and Merck (50%). This firm has capabilities in fermentation, 
genetic engineering/rDNA, cell culture, hybridoma, protein engineering, and tissue culture. 
By forming this alliance, Merck was able to exchange its strengths with Du Pont, an early 
investor in biotechnology. Du Pont-Merck Pharmaceutical has also developed its own 
drugs in cardiovascular disease.7 Like other pharmaceutical companies, they continue to 
sell their branded products as long as they can once they have gone off patent but at a 
lower price in order to meet generic competition. Cost conscious HMO's increase this 
downward price pressure. Yet, according to Merck some demand for the branded product 
continues once they adjust the price downward. This is due to better quality, consistent 
dosage, and brand awareness of the original. 
Strategically, Merck sees itself as a growth company with a growth target of about 
15% per year. This signals a continuing need for cash flow, i.e. from existing drugs, and a 
Merck sold its share to Dupont in 1998 for over $4billion, apparantly due to its ability to manage more drugs itself. 
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constant flow of new drugs, i.e. from R&D. They need this growth to continue to offer 
their shareholders the return they expect and to attract the personnel they need to develop 
drugs which is their corporate mission. Their products now cover 15-16 therapeutic 
categories. In five years this will expand to between 20 and 25 categories depending on 
the success of various stages of drug testing. Important new products in the pipeline 
include Singulair for asthma, Aggrastat for cardiovascular disorders, Maxalt for migraine 
headaches, and VIOXX, an anti-inflammatory drug, which works as a selective inhibitor 
targeted at rheumatoid arthritis. They are in phase III trials for all of these new drugs. 
Propecia for male pattern baldness recently received FDA approval. 
Merck's R&D is done internationally. To avoid duplicate investment, each 
research center tends to be focused. For example, the Neuroscience Research Centre in 
the Untied Kingdom focuses on compounds which affect the nervous system. Maxalt was 
developed in this Centre. The one laboratory in Italy studies viruses; while the one 
laboratory in Tsukuba, Japan (Banyu Pharmaceuticals) emphasizes the circulatory system, 
antibiotics, and anti-cancer research (Giga, Ueda and Kuramoto 1996). This concentration 
pattern often reflects the comparative strengths in R&D and the therapeutic demand 
structure in each local market. 
Still, selecting the appropriate R&D projects while critical to their success is very 
difficult. This is because no discipline in science has as blurred a distinction between basic 
and applied research as biotechnology. The distinction is usually not well-defined because 
applied research often contributes to basic research. Indeed, in molecular biology, science 
often follows technology. Still, as a general approach, Merck tries to focus on applied 
research and development rather than basic science. They rely on universities and smaller 
biotech firms for the later. However, they do some basic research. For instance, they did 
basic research related to AIDS, and it was from this they developed the protease inhibitors 
that are now a basic part of AIDS therapy. Their approach is to gather information from 
published and ongoing research in various life sciences and to then look for solutions. 
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Since they need a return on their investment in R&D to stay in business, a potential 
solution has to have a market big enough to justify further investment. If it has therapeutic 
potential but not a large market potential, they will usually get another entity to pursue it. 
Smaller companies who do not see much chance in competing head-on with major 
companies tend to pursue drugs with smaller market potential. 
As part of their R&D drug evaluation process, Merck also recognizes that even if 
it is the first to market, someone else may produce drugs in the same therapeutic area. 
This is because the basic research is available to anybody else who is also tracking basic 
science. If these competitive later drugs are superior in terms of efficacy and cost 
effectiveness, the second drug to get FDA approval can in fact win the market race. For 
this reason, from a strategic viewpoint Merck has organized a designer chemical group to 
modify and optimize the chemical once a compound has been identified as working. This 
strategy is also partly driven by the cost containment movement in major health care 
markets. Since today's healthcare providers analyze the cost effectiveness associated with 
drugs, ones that are less troublesome to administer are preferred. This is because long 
term treatment cost depends on how easily patients follow the prescription and how often 
nurses have to assist them. 
In addition to efficacy, there are two other important issues in drug development: 
bioavailability (the rate and extent to which a dose actually reaches its destination in the 
body) and safety. To get such good results, information technology plays an important 
role. The first is in regard to molecular modeling. They design particular molecules meant 
to achieve drug-receptor binding. (As explained above, the "key and lock" 
complementarity between a drug and a biological receptor in our body was suggested in 
the early 1990s.) Merck then combines this information with data mining. They have a 
library collection of chemicals they have discovered that includes about one million items. 
Associated with each chemical is a description and information about it, including the 
results of any animal or clinical studies plus side effects. When they identify a new 
31 
molecule, using the computer and search-engines, they then look for similar molecules or 
chemicals they have already discovered or know about. This gives them some idea what 
the new molecule might do or what they should examine further, including safety issues. 
For example, their development of AIDS drugs involved 32 possible versions of 
the same chemical molecule. Without the computer it would have been very difficult and 
time-consuming if not impossible to analyze and screen them one by one. However, it was 
possible to do the screening rather efficiently due to the computer's ability to visualize and 
display complex three-dimensional structures. This technique as outlined above is often 
called "rational drug design," although some scientists prefer to call it structure-based 
drug design. This is because the new method has its weaknesses and cannot substitute for 
an older method, sometimes called "random drug design". 
Merck also uses information technology methods based on combinatorial 
chemistry. This method is becoming more popular among other major pharmaceutical 
companies too. As already explained, combinatorial chemistry speeds up the process of 
generating novel leads and optimizing previously known leads. This improvement is 
important since synthetic chemistry traditionally took time and had limited efficiency. This 
new method involves a large library of compounds from which they generate mixtures of 
the compounds in the library. This is a very large interactive data base management 
system. 
Under this system, biologists develop a set of assays which conform to a particular 
standard from certain biological surrogates which they use to test the efficacy of the 
molecule with respect to a certain disease. They can run a high volume of molecules and 
tests in this way. This is called high-throughput screening. Since they have libraries of 
similar assays kept in a standard way, they can do a lot of computer based testing using 
algorithms which would suggest likely results before moving to animal testing. The idea 
behind this is that similarity in action often suggests similarity in mechanisms of action, 
mode of resistance, and molecular structure. To ensure consistency across tests, they have 
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established various repeatable procedures. Thus, the computer, software, the organized 
data bases, and the established procedures are highly complementary. Not only this but the 
recent developments in science such as genomics and biotechnology and the 
transformation of the market all underlie Merck's strategy of expanding the therapeutic 
areas quickly. Still, according to our contact at Merck, no single technology would 
determine their R&D trajectories. Rather, it requires a complex mix of talents covering not 
only R&D but also marketing and manufacture, finance, corporate development, and 
information systems. 
For this reason, their R&D process begins with a contract with a development 
team. The contract covers who is involved, what resources are needed, and a timetable. If 
it is clear even after a month that the contract is not being met, there will be a review and 
either the contract will be adjusted or the project will be terminated. The success of the 
laboratory is measured by how many compounds can be marketed. But this is dependent 
on successful drug selection. Therefore, the choice of what to pursue and what not to 
pursue is the most important decision they or any drug company can make and it is the 
ability to manage this process effectively that will determine corporate success. For every 
potential candidate compound, they have to do an economic analysis. This is why 
manufacturing and marketing people are on the initial contract assessment review panel in 
addition to the top R&D people. That is, it does not make sense to pursue a solution to a 
disease unless there is a strong potential for drug development and a very large market 
potential to justify the commitment of resources. After this decision is made, there is a 
series of stage reviews to constantly check on the performance of the R&D process. The 
review focuses on the probability of success and the payoff if one is successful. Difficult 
projects are sometimes chosen because Merck knows other companies will face similar 
difficulties in developing such drugs. 
Some types of drugs are more costly than others to manufacture or to conduct 
clinical trials. The review process takes these factors into account. The cost difference in 
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the latter case comes from the difficulty of proving effectiveness. For instance, it is 
relatively easy to show the effects of a drug for infectious diseases in comparison to a drug 
for cancer or heart disease. Anti-cancer and cardiovascular drugs require long-term 
observation and more patients need to be involved in the trial. It is not unusual to have 
4000-5000 patients over a 5-6 year period. This necessitates tremendous data gathering 
and data management and is thus an important aspect of their IT strategy. 
Further, since HMOs now demand cost effectiveness in addition to efficacy, 
pharmaceutical companies have responded by doing outcome research. For example, they 
try to show how their drugs will help patients to go back to work as soon as possible. 
Although getting this kind of information from the outset is cheaper than adding it later, it 
still costs them more money through added complexity. It is also a political process as we 
have seen in the pressure of AIDS activists on the FDA to speed up the drug approval 
process for related treatments. 
Merck is well known for their ability to effectively design clinical trials to satisfy 
FDA requirements. This core competency has contributed to the relative efficiency with 
which many new drugs developed by Merck have received FDA approval in recent years 
(Gambardella 1995). In particular, they believe it is important to design effective clinical 
trials which have good statistical power. Before any clinical trial, they develop a protocol 
which defines the variables to be measured and how they will do it. It covers what types of 
patients will be included in the study, what dosage they will be given, how the controls 
will be managed, and the measurement criteria. Clinical trials are very costly and represent 
roughly one third of the cost of developing a new drug. There is thus a stage review at the 
beginning of the clinical trial and as the trial reaches various milestones. 
To improve the quality of the clinical trial data they have also supplied PCs to the 
investigators and have had them input the data directly rather than waiting for their own 
people to gather results. This speeded up the data entry process and made the 
investigators more aware of the data entry process. However, Merck found not all the 
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data were consistent and that they had to do a lot of cross checking. Therefore, they now 
send their own Merck people with laptops into the field to enter the data directly from the 
patients charts. The people at Merck sponsoring the trial are responsible for gathering 
accurate data. They have found it is cheaper fixing the data at the collection point than 
trying to adjust it later. In fact, the cost of fixing it goes up by a factor often at each 
subsequent stage. This approach has had the added benefit of putting the clinical trial data 
collection on a real time rather than on a batch basis as in the past. This has proved a real 
benefit since companies are now under pressure in clinical studies to find centers that can 
deliver the highest quality data in the shortest time. This is because the opportunity cost 
and revenue impact of faster study execution and higher data quality is so high when it 
achieves FDA approval and thus marketing revenues more quickly. Under these 
circumstances the direct cost of gathering the data directly is a secondary matter (Hovde 
1997) compared to quickly receiving FDA approval. This is a clear case of how total cost 
analysis can justify the development of a customized information subsystem provided the 
proper analytics and decision making criteria are in place. 
Manufacturing has also become more strategically important. Merck used to try to 
have enough product to supply the customer what they needed. Now they analyze whether 
they are the only source for a drug or if a customer can easily get a similar drug or a 
generic version from a competitor if Merck does not have enough product on hand. 
Through this process they hope to reduce expensive inventories. This is because their drug 
production process is primarily a batch process. Thus, they and others in the industry have 
generally produced enough supply for several weeks, and then cleaned the plant to 
produce another drug. This manufacturing approach when combined with full availability 
for all drugs builds inventory and cost. They have therefore moved away from this supply 
structure even though supply chain analysis, such as just-in-time production, is not 
amenable to their production system. Rather, what they have done is to break the 
manufacturing process into three separate stages which they manage. 
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These stages are (1) bulk manufacture of the pharmaceutical ingredients, (2) the 
formulation of the product, i.e. transforming the active ingredients produced in the first 
stage, and (3) packaging. There are two basic approaches to the first stage. One is to use 
special purpose equipment; the other is to use flexible equipment. The latter approach 
involves cleaning plants to switch the chemical ingredients, which tends to lead to large 
inventories and puts pressure on production capacity as they try to expand the number of 
therapeutic drugs they are marketing. Even though Merck has 30 plants world-wide, 
because of environmental regulations, getting new plants in the United States is becoming 
more difficult. This partially explains their decision to get out of generics. But in any case 
it means they need to get as many drugs produced in their existing plants as possible. This 
has led to greater emphasis on special purpose equipment that allows them to shift 
production more easily between products reducing inventories and cycle times. 
They have also taken another approach which is to make the new drugs stronger 
so their one day dosage is smaller in volume. Thus, capacity becomes less important as 
they get more pills from a given output. Further, most drugs require four to five stages 
and some requires seventeen steps to produce. To make the production process efficient, 
it is therefore desirable to reduce the number of production stages. In general, going 
through more stages reduces the amount of output from a given amount of input (Fukao 
1994). In addition, the cost of handling intermediate goods at each stage adds to 
production costs. 
Merck now uses information technology to control and manage these aspects of 
the supply chain, thus extending their move towards "controlled production" where every 
aspect of drug development, production and delivery is monitored and controlled 
including after sales side effects. In manufacturing, they use CIM (Computer Integrated 
Manufacturing) where the entire factory is linked together under centralized control. Their 
approach is "the best of breed" approach. They try to buy the best package available that 
meets their requirements. However, the integration of these into a total manufacturing 
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system or suite to produce the product in the most cost effective way is their own 
proprietary middleware system which they developed. That is, they developed a set of 
tools needed to integrate Merck's manufacturing system and services. Dr. Popper felt 
Merck's approach was different from Takeda's whom they had visited and who he said 
were impressive. They licensed the system to Logica, but it never sold. This attempt at 
marketing the product was to reduce the continuing cost of support. 
Nevertheless, even without external sales, Dr. Popper was convinced they got full 
value for both the packages they bought and the integration system they developed. This is 
because they subject the selection of software and IT (Information Technology) projects 
to the same contract/review discipline they use in developing drugs. They use IT to help 
control business processes. In fact, IT people are intimately involved in this process from 
an organizational as well as an operations standpoint. For example, Dr. Popper sits on 
several of the contract evaluation committees. They have now forced the marketing and 
manufacturing people to work together. This has been successful since each function 
recognized they needed to solve the same problem. Since Merck's organizational 
reengineering group also reports to Dr. Popper, it is easier for him to achieve this type of 
integration and monitor its performance. 
In their tabletting plant in England for instance where they have their most 
advanced CIM operation, they have now moved to a paperless operation but with regular 
interfaces top to bottom with other plants that are supplying them with bulk chemical 
formulations. In this process, they have reduced their cycle times from 2 weeks or one 
month to 5 days. They are almost ready to produce to order. Unfortunately, they have 
only been able to do this for tablets so far but they are moving towards trying to do it for 
all plants. Even after mass-scale production starts, plant workers contribute significantly to 
reducing the operating cost. This requires good detailed understanding of the underlying 
process and information sharing. Furthermore, all processes eventually get into trouble. 
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Local engineers have to interpret the information and act on it. So, good data systems 
such as "process data management systems" are needed. 
Merck also saved over $400 million through its procurement re-engineering 
project. Since Merck is a very big company covering many regions and functions, it is 
difficult to track and coordinate all the transactions both inside the company and with 
other companies. The team tried to reduce the number of global suppliers from 40,000 to 
10,000 and to consolidate the product volumes purchased such that Merck could improve 
its bargaining power and increase the percentage of firms under contract from 20% to 
80%. To achieve this goal Merck developed customized data structures and decision 
support systems. While they could use some commercial software packages, to get full 
functionality and impact, they had to create their own messaging system to integrate 
procurement with other activities. As the basic procurement module, they chose SAP's R3 
procurement module based on its architectural flexibility, scalability, functionality and the 
supplier's global support capabilities since Merck needed to implement the system 
worldwide. 
The new system helped Merck to order electronically and reduce paperwork. This 
created order information that could be used for budget approvals. In addition, the 
decision support system provides employee customers with opportunities to ask questions 
about procurement data, and they can now find savings opportunities through access to 
this database. To integrate the SAP module with Merck's other computer applications, 
Merck developed a "telephone switch" technology. Merck used a set of middleware 
products they purchased and integrated themselves since they needed to be aligned with 
their own unique systems and organizational structure. The switch is the Transaction Data 
Manager from Century Analysis, the store and forward product is MQ series, now from 
IBM. This switch also performs a translation from the language of a "sending" application 
to the language of the "receiving" application. The local language of the sending 
application is translated into a "neutral" language, "Merck Common Business Language." 
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By putting this common language in the middle, Merck reduced the number of translations 
required between local languages effectively speeding and facilitating the exchange of 
information. In effect, Merck solved an information engineering problem so that they 
could quickly reconcile the kinds of information one application needs to send to or 
receive from other applications. This integrated information can then be stored in data 
warehouses to support various computerized decision systems. 
They have also attacked inventory control more directly. They have joined the 
North American Supply Chain Project, which involves U.S. marketing and manufacturing 
sharing responsibility for the availability of certain drugs. Desired level of inventory differs 
from drug to drug. Since pharmacists may switch to different brands for a patient if you do 
not keep a certain level of inventory to supplly the pharmacies continually, Merick 
previously kept inventories at levels in various geographic centers that enabled them to fill 
98% of pharmacies' orders. Now, as explained above, they do a more sophisticated 
calculation using internal formulas to manage and target the percent they want to fill over 
a wider range. They set sales targets and then assess whether a competitor in the North 
American Supply Chain Project would take the order if they did not fill it. Interestingly, 
this kind of order management (ERP/MRP) has reduced the number of backorders below 
their targeted measures and has lowered inventories while actually increasing availability. 
This result has surprised them but seems to be due to the fact that to keep their own 
inventories low pharmacists were doing more switching them Meric realized without 
ordering more supply. Their interface with their customers are generally standard IS 
interface protocols. They also get a standard set of data on physician prescriptions (24 
months) which is available to all the drug companies. 
However, they do have their own established format for this data such that they 
get this purchased information into a form that is useful to them. Sales representatives 
carry laptops to target sales and have the prescription information downloaded into their 
laptops. They then know the prescription habits of the doctors in their geographical area 
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and also for each type of therapeutic use. The sales representatives can then prioritize their 
visits to the doctors. In the future, Merck expects even a bigger use of such database 
marketing which will enable them to compare the performance of a sales representative 
with his competitors in each region. They also use IT to forecast the demand for new 
products. This is very difficult, particularly for those products in new therapeutic areas. 
They thus think they need to find more analytical tools to do their forecasting. 
Managerial Decision Making 
Merck uses real options analysis in their R&D decision making (Harvard Business 
Review Jan-Feb 1994). The traditional method of comparing discounted cash flows is 
misleading since it does not take into account the loss in value from exercising an option 
and the increase in value from creating an option (Dixit 1995) when an option is 
understood as the right but not the obligation to pursue a business opportunity. Thus the 
option itself has a positive value which should not be ignored. 
When projects require committing resources that cannot be transferred to other 
purposes, it is often beneficial to wait and observe more about the project. Such waiting 
without giving up the right to pursue the project has value since one can avoid expenses 
today when some future event may indicate against continuing. Similarly, the present 
discounted value of undertakings which create new options also tend to be underestimated 
since they give the added benefit of future flexibility to pursue projects only when the 
future profitability of those projects seems more certain. Pharmaceutical R&D offers 
ample opportunities for using such decision making criteria. This is because drug 
companies compete in a market involving many uncertainties. For example, R&D 
sometimes benefits from new scientific findings that occur in the middle of a project. Yet, 
given long product lead times, to bring drugs to market first it is often necessary to start 
R&D projects that only appear likely to generate many attractive options in the future. 
This situation fits well with this kind of option analysis. Merck also uses this analysis in 
hedging against foreign exchange fluctuations using derivatives and long-term foreign 
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exchange futures as well as in evaluating acquisitions of other companies. Merck's CFO 
Judy Lewent acknowledges support from senior executives and other divisions in 
introducing the Monte Carlo simulation (CFO 1994) for these purposes. 
Since Merck has considerable data on their past successes and failures in R&D, 
they can use this and other information such as the stock price of a competing biotech 
company to value an investment in a particular drug or therapeutic solution. They have 
adopted this method because accounting rates of returns are upward-biased measures of 
the true profitability of R&D investments. This result follows from the fact that 
accountants treat R&D as an expense rather than as an investment. This method 
understates the value of pharmaceutical companies' assets in a R&D project and 
overstates their rates of return (Myers and Howe 1997). Furthermore, it does not consider 
the fact that as an R&D project progresses, the project risk declines. Therefore, to 
calculate the present value and the return to investors, a Monte Carlo simulation is used to 
predict these values under different scenarios. Each scenario is generated from a unique 
set of random draws from probability distributions based on the odds of a drug's 
discovery, survival and commercial success profile. Since R&D decisions are sequential, 
the real options analysis takes into account the flexibility of not making a commitment 
(sunk investment) as having value. Senior managers use this Monte Carlo simulation in 
their decision making. Another use is in managing the contingent progress payments to 
smaller companies or university research. After giving money upfront, the company has 
the right not to pursue the project further. The real options analysis is relevant in this 
regard. 
Merck management takes a team approach under CEO Gilmartin to such decision 
making. He created world-wide business strategy teams, each of which is focused on a key 
disease. Executives from many functions develop a disease related drug development and 
marketing strategy in a coordinated manner. He relies on the judgment of specialist 
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executives such as those in R&D for R&D related decisions but the overall business 
decision is made by the team (Business Week. November 25). 
Decision Making on IT projects 
IT functions except for Medco are centralized under Dr. Popper, especially the 
basic IT infrastructure such as large mainframe computers. At the same time, systems 
development units are aligned with each business unit and report to the head of the 
business unit in addition to Dr. Popper. The business units include R&D, manufacturing, 
and U.S. sales and marketing. Sales units are generally localized while IT and 
manufacturing can be more centralized. This is because health care markets differ across 
countries due to local laws and customs. On the other hand, the relevant information 
about chemical plants are mostly described by numerical data related to their equipment. 
This type of data favors centralization. IT people work with each business partner to help 
them implement their functional strategy. To coordinate activities across functions, they 
have a worldwide business team composed of senior functional managers who analyze the 
market according to disease categories such as cholesterol lowering drugs. They each 
conduct stage reviews, including drug safety. Important information is reported to 
functional heads and the worldwide business team which includes an IT person. 
The EDP (electronic data processing) operation at Merck seems fairly large. 750 
people are doing software development and its EDP (electronic data processing) operation 
has 350 people working on infrastructure and support. Merck does not have its own 
captive software suppliers. They do 60% of the software development internally and 
purchase 40% of their software from unrelated companies. They develop core software 
products for clinical trial systems, basic research, sales force automation systems, and data 
warehouse applications. They buy financial, human resource, and MRP software from 
outside. Dr. Popper does not think client servers and office computers combined with 
work stations and PCs will replace the mainframe. This is particularly true for 
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manufacturing class servers where they need the greater mainframe speed and capacity. 
Further, they expect to use supercomputers indefinitely in their basic research. 
The project approval committees (PAC's) are also involved in the business review 
process for IT projects and apply the same selection methods and criteria as they do for 
drugs since an investment in an IT project means less money available for investment in a 
new drug which is their basic business. Thus, at each stage people who are responsible for 
the project sign a contract. This process starts with an analysis of the project's conceptual 
feasibility. Then, they assess the project's order of magnitude in terms of cost and benefits 
using measures of both money and/or quality. This detailed analysis identifies costs and 
benefits with allowances for margins of error of +/-25%. This leads to a contract with the 
project team. One of Dr. Popper's responsibilities is to manage this portfolio of IT 
projects. 
The analysis looks at the IT project portfolio through a bubble chart that 
categorizes projects into four types in terms of risk and benefit with bubble size indicating 
the cost or resources committed. These are high risk and benefit or impact. Such projects 
usually require new inventions or systems. There are low benefit and high risk, which are 
to be avoided while the best are low risk and high benefit. The latter are often found 
through a combination of packaged and customized software where many bugs have 
already been sorted out in advance. IT maintenance including upgrades is low impact-low 
risk. 
Low Risk High Risk 
High Impact (Benefit) High Impact, Low Risk High Impact, High Risk 
Low Impact Low Imapact, Low Risk Low Impact, High Risk 
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They use the net present cost over the life cycle of the project to arrive at the size 
of the bubble. In addition, the PACs do not look at IS in isolation but see them as part of 
the business system supporting successful product development and marketing. That is, 
Merck recognizes that the whole system needs to succeed for the IT strategy to succeed. 
For this reason, they insist each IT project have some metric which is identified and agreed 
to in advance as part of the contract. This metric specifies what is going to change if the 
project is successful so they can identify if it was actually successful. Thus, they try to 
express quality in financial terms. In this regard, they have found that the quality of 
medical care a drug offers may be identified by consumer surveys and customer 
satisfaction. Investing in brand name recognition also requires some metric. Thus Merck 
considers it important to identify such instruments to measure successes as well as failures. 
This type of planning in numerical terms would make it possible to compare the 
desirability of multiple projects, taking into account their possible consequences from an 
organizational viewpoint. Centralized managerial decision making seems necessary to 
successfully implement such an information technology strategy. It also makes people 
aware of the externalities across the various functions that IT creates. Since each business 
function pays for their IT support, the system and data come full circle in that these 
functions must justify their IT budgets. 
Another aspect of controlling information that concerns Merck is their need to 
have consistency in the terms used to describe particular outcomes. They have found by 
controlling their IT, they can play a role in increasing quality care by forcing on other 
firms and medical practitioners an agreement with respect to standards in using the same 
terms to describe the same things from Merck's perspective. This reflects the fact that in 
the medical field, there are often multiple classifications of diseases. Merck has developed 
its own lexicon which is available through a Netscape browser on the Internet for use in 
clinical trials. This kind of lexicon has helped to create better control and consistency for 
analytical and measurement purposes. It also means data in the database is collected and 
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classified in a consistent way which allows for greater compatibility which can feed back 
into the R&D process. They also use librarians to reclassify the types of diseases if 
someone else uses other ways of classifying particular diseases in various publications. 
Current multiple standards at WHO, FDA, etc make comparability a problem. These are 
issues that need to be addressed in the future, but to the extent Merck is successful and is 
able to set standards for how data is gathered and classified, it will clearly give them an 
ongoing strategic advantage in areas such as drug design, expediting clinical trials, and 
FDA approvals. 
Some organizations do not take full advantage of new IT systems since the new 
systems sometimes introduce difficulties if they are not compatible with how people work 
with one another or the system. For this reason, it is important to do advanced research 
and pilot projects before their introduction. One example of how Merck understands and 
manages this is their worldwide introduction of a new ledger software system. First, they 
identified all the customers for the system and then discussed it with these major 
stakeholders in terms of their requirements. Based on this, they examined a number of 
packages and asked vendors for discussion and product demonstrations. This measured 
system functionality against user requirements to see which best fit their identified needs. 
They interviewed other clients of each vendor to understand their product implementation 
approach and possible pitfalls. This stage saves money and organization time since 
software is an "experience good" whose value and shortcomings are only made clear after 
introduction. Since Merck implemented JDE internationally first, they discussed the 
product with their affiliates too and then piloted it in U.K. before its worldwide 
implementation. In addition, all the functions and conditions were tested in a conference 
room pilot environment prior to going live. 
This kind of review, assessment and implementation process is becoming very 
important as IS (information system) business development costs are rising faster than 
overall costs while infrastructure costs are rising half as fast. While some of this is due to 
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the improved cost performance of mainframes and other computers, it is also a problem in 
that many managers think mainframe time is costless. One of Dr. Popper's current tasks is 
to explain to them how much it actually costs and to get this included in the appropriate 
budgets. Telecom costs are going up in line with IS costs, though they may use more in 
the future if they can figure out how to control all the security issues related to the 
Internet. Right now they are limiting access. 
The critical management issue for Dr. Popper is to put the appropriate system in 
place for each situation. Since the PACs are the key to this process and achieving this 
goal, he makes sure there are senior managers on his PACs. Getting them involved has 
been a major management and strategic breakthrough. For the same reason, Dr. Popper is 
strongly against the concept of outsourcing since he believes one is then giving up control 
over the key information behind the business, and Merck will have to compromise in 
aligning the appropriate IT system with a given business situation. In addition, if the 
information system relates to a core business, it may not be safe. For example, an 
inefficient IT system could make a business more volatile, and transaction volume (trials, 
marketing) could get out of control. This view is probably similar to Toyota's feelings 
concerning its Just-In-Time system, although Toyota's system involves more parts and a 
greater variety of products from the same factory. In Toyota's system, a downstream 
production unit orders an upstream unit to produce the number of parts that is necessary. 
Any slack during their production is considered waste while having too much inventory 
also makes it difficult to discern problems in the system until it is too late. 
Further, Merck feels outsourcing IT may not be a reversible decision. This is 
because it may shift control over important information related to future business needs. If 
Merck is not aware of that information or does not control how it is gathered and 
processed, it could constrain its flexibility and responsiveness with adverse strategic 
consequences. At the same time, some information does seem less strategic and it may be 
cheaper and more efficient to outsource this. Dr. Popper is helping the new head of human 
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resources to make this type of calculation, though in evaluating whether to retain control, 
he makes sure he includes an appropriate cost for the mainframe in terms of incremental 
cost and time. This is because a previous analysis showed the company saved $1 million 
by doing it in-house, but ignored the cost of the mainframe and its supporting systems. He 
is also monitoring to what extent it makes sense to outsource telecom. His view is that 
there are probably niche functions in non-core and non-strategic areas where it makes 
sense to outsource. However, he cannot understand those who rely solely on outside IT 
resources, since he feels the outside service will not react to the firm's business needs 
because their people are unable to be involved in the day to day operation of the business. 
Strategic IT planning is thus a tacit knowledge process in which people must be constantly 
engaged. So outsourcing definitely must be done on a very selective basis. This shows 
Merck's make-or-buy decision requires consideration about its future strategic flexibility 
as well as its ability to monitor the information that drives the business. 
Joint Ventures 
Dr. Popper noted that full exchange of information was difficult even when they 
had a formal business partnership. In the case of the joint venture with Johnson & 
Johnson, for example, they only exchange planning assumptions in the OTC (over the 
counter) medicine business (packaging and tabletting). The interaction is arm's length. 
This joint venture does not do research. In the case of Du Pont-Merck, though, where 
they were doing joint research, he worked with their CIO (Chief Information Officer) to 
set up methods on projects where they are working together for particular researchers to 
have access to certain data bases at Merck and vice versa. They used secure ID Token 
cards and dual firewall systems through a point-to-point lease line to control these Intranet 
links. In addition, Merck did not integrated their supply chain (marketing, sales, 
manufacturing, distribution). This shows agreement is necessary for some information to 
flow across organizational boundaries. Joint ventures in this case appear to be one way to 
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modulate the disclosure of information between the involved parties for their mutual 
benefit. 
Medco Division 
Due to complaints from their competitors as well as government regulatory 
concerns, the Medco division has its own information systems, and any interconnections 
are through firewalls to protect the integrity of their competitors' sales information from 
Merck. But they now share some technical standards, and they have kept the development 
of their systems parallel so gradually they can erase the differences. Both these actions 
should over time reduce costs and facilitate the sharing of non-competitive data. For 
example, they will be able to exchange Merck-related information on patients more 
efficiently. Dr. Popper was quite explicit however that Medco does not favor Merck over 
other suppliers unless Medco's recommendation of Merck products is legitimate. 
Nevertheless, they have gradually been increasing their share of Medco's sales. 
Still, they do not have access to Medco's database. This is a key point that has 
been misperceived by the market. Merck does not get any diagnosis information, and in 
fact currently there is no standard on how patients records are kept in the United States. 
In the future, in combination with their lexicon described above, they hope to use Medco 
as a way to get more detailed and consistent patient data on Merck products than they can 
currently get from the national prescription database. Ultimately, what they would like at 
the next stage are complete patient clinical records collected according to agreed 
standards which would give those records over a 5-10 year horizon. They are making 
some progress in this area, and this is where Medco could prove helpful. It also illustrates 
how Merck is using a form of embedded software, in this case prescription data related to 
their drugs, to develop an interactive data base that can impact all aspects of their business 
from drug development to sales and marketing, including Medco's own operations. It is 
also using IT as a way to influence and control their external environment, an aspect of 
"Controlled Production". 
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This is because Merck-Medco's mail order business is a powerful marketing tool. 
It can sell drugs at a lower price than other pharmacies. In turn Merck "mines its terabyte 
data warehouse to uncover hidden links between illnesses and known drug treatments, and 
to spot trends that help pinpoint which drugs are most effective for what types of 
patients." (Datamation 1997). This is how it works. With the help of Medco Data, the 
organization that provides Merck-Medco with system support, Medco designed a user-
friendly system to conduct datamining and OLAP querying against the Medco's database 
containing some 76 million patient and treatment records. Merck-Medco them spent four 
years turning this huge database into one of the largest mineable massively parallel data 
warehouses in the U.S. using an NCR Teradata 5100 database platform. Through this 
process they managed to clean biases hidden in multiple data sources and standardized 
conditions, enriching its data by integrating additional data on health trends and drug use. 
They then combined traditional SQL and OLAP products with a sophisticated GUI 
(Graphical User Interface) as well as data-analysis algorithms (Datamation 1997). In this 
way, IT expertise has been useful and instrumental to Merck in asking and answering 
questions it needs to address to operate successfully in the current and future cost 
containment environment. 
Information Technology and Organization 
As we have described above, Merck like other major pharmaceutical firms faces 
multiple business environments where they must justify the use of their drugs to 
increasingly cost conscious customers in terms of improved efficacy and benefits at the 
same time that the development of new drugs is becoming more complex and expensive. 
Yet, they recognize that only by developing and marketing new and more effective ethical 
drugs can they grow and prosper. Further, these drugs must be sold globally to amortize 
their high development costs. To do this efficiently requires sophisticated techniques to 
acquire and manipulate large amounts of data in a standardized manner at several levels, 
including R&D, clinical trials, manufacturing, marketing and after sales results. 
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Therefore, using systematic research data and sophisticated analytical methods 
successfully in their decision making is critical to their current business and future growth. 
However, even though the need to use information technology is clear, they believe the 
basic purpose of these systems is to improve the firms' existing decision-making skills 
which have been responsible for their current success. That is, using systems should not 
result in automatic managerial decisions but rather should improve the quality of decisions 
by enhancing the experience and judgment of managers. Therefore, even though one 
important role for software is to facilitate better communication, they are also strong 
believers in face-to-face communication among managers in formulating strategies. 
At the same time, Merck does not believe the more information everyone has the 
better, i.e. that all information should be freely shared among everyone in the firm. Thus 
Merck consciously tries to create some barriers among non-R&D employees to limit the 
information flow to those with some need to know. However, they are reluctant to create 
such information barriers among R&D employees since R&D employees only usually 
request information when there is a reason, an impulse that can be important to their 
creative process. Indeed, the use of software provides researchers with the common 
language in which they think and talk. It is essential for multidisciplinary medical 
researchers to have a common ground and share a part of their chemical intuition. They 
thus feel the use of software enlarges and extends researchers' knowledge domains. 
How has information technology affected this organization? Although the power 
of PCs has risen substantially, their information management remains centralized. This 
reflects the scientific nature of the data. In addition, the ease of upgrading and the need to 
safeguard their proprietary information favors a centralized approach to software 
management and development. At the same time, it would appear that the firm has less 
need for job rotation given they now have more cross-divisional exchange of information 
electronically and via more cross functional committees. Still, there is a high degree of 
specialization within this industry and the firm's R&D specialists and managers tend to 
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stay in their area of expertise throughout their careers. So job rotation for other than 
general managers is relatively low. Still, by facilitating senior managers' access to 
information at all levels, the firms have decreased the number of middle managers they 
require while at the same time expanding the skill base of those that remain and their 
functional areas of responsibility. Thus they are conscious of the relation of power and 
information and are careful when introducing new information technology tools about 
possible changes in the distribution of authority and power among employees. However, 
their basic approach of using information technology to enhance and improve existing core 
competencies avoids many of these organizational dilemmas since people can see their 
effectiveness and the company's competitive situation is improved without the need for 
substantial reorganization and its accompanying disruption. 
This strategy contrasts with companies such as Bayer that use a minmax approach 
to software use and development which focuses on achieving maximum user functionality 
for the least cost. Under this system, a firm uses a package if it achieves 80% of the 
functionality users request but does not evaluate whether the additional 20% represents a 
critical added value or is important in maintaining a core competency. Also, it stresses 
centralized IT control more to facilitate upgrades than to develop strategies and allocate 
resources. They do not support certain R&D functions even when the user may require it 
to efficiently utilize an historical data base or certain programs which may only be 
available for a MAC or VAX system. This minmax strategy is supported by a review 
process that has a check list of 20 to 25 benefits that are evaluated for each IT project, 
making it difficult to isolate one or two key business factors in terms of IT integration or 
the enhancement of core competencies critical to the drug pipeline (Track 1997). This in 
turn makes it difficult to assess the projects ultimate success or failure. 
The popular press and many reengineering specialists have stressed that a logical 
organizational outcome of improved information systems is a flattened organization 
because it is now easier and more efficient for top management to communicate with 
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lower levels in the organization, and middle management is no longer required to process 
information or to manage and set objectives for smaller organization subunits. Being able 
to eliminate tiers of middle managers in turn saves money and is thus cost efficient. For 
Merck, information technology has had these direct effects. They see less layers as 
desirable to make more information available more quickly to management in a rapidly 
changing market. Each person is now able to process more information and has broader 
skills than before. However, this has not led to large personnel reductions. Rather, each 
person's scope of skills has become broader which means a person, such as those 
managing clinical trials, can accomplish more tasks within an expanding market. 
Therefore, it was the need for clearer accountability not the impact of more direct 
communication that was the main driver for Merck's development of a more flattened 
organization with information technology enhancing and facilitating this strategic decision. 
It did not stress easier monitoring of subordinates via improved information systems as a 
principal reason for the move to a more flattened organization. 
This result is similar to other responses that indicate that for Merck the role of 
information technology has been to enhance and extend existing strategies and core 
competencies rather than to restructure or fundamentally change their organization. At the 
same time, it is apparent through a creative mix of customized, semi-customized and 
packaged software that they have created an information system and an organizational 
support for that system which has significantly improved their competitiveness in a wide 
number of areas. An important aspect of this has been the interactive linking of various 
functions that in the past were relatively separate: R&D, the drug approval process, 
manufacturing, marketing, sales and after-sales service. For example, in the case of Merck 
the development of standardized data bases and access to patient prescription data has 
allowed them to better monitor drug use after purchase. This has improved their sales 
forecasts which has helped manufacturing to reduce production runs which has improved 
inventory levels and shelf life. Their long run objective of production on demand takes this 
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development to its logical conclusion. Lower inventories of expensive new drugs reduce 
costs which in combination with the better information on therapeutic results helps 
marketing in terms of showing cost conscious HMOs the cost efficiency as well as the 
efficacy of their drugs. This improves sales which of course helps to finance the drug 
pipeline. It has also helped R&D more directly in terms of therapeutic activity and results 
that enables them to work on reducing the side effects of existing drugs plus targeting 
areas for new drug development. 
In turn, R&D can now work on more drugs because the improved information 
systems Merck has developed to managed clinical trials can now handle as many as 24-25 
drugs at a time instead of 16-18 as in the past. This of course improves the chances of 
having a "blockbuster" drug, spreads fixed development costs over a wider range of 
products, and extends the therapeutic areas they can address. The latter then allows them 
to benefit from economies of scope in manufacturing, sales and marketing. 
Another information systems benefit linking previously separate functions is the 
increased complexity of manufacturing the new right-handed and left-handed drugs 
created through molecular modeling. Some of these manufacturing processes are new and 
can be patented. In addition, they often require several steps in different manufacturing 
facilities. Therefore, even when these drugs go off-patent, Merck may be able to retain 
control for several more years. This extends the traditional life of a drug and justifies 
concentrating greater research resources to their development while Merck will be able to 
build their proprietary clinical trial and prescription data base that supports developing 
drugs through these new design techniques. This will put them farther ahead in terms of 
this type of drug development and their successful marketing. That is, success, profits and 
expertise tend to compound. 
In the introduction to this case, it was noted a potential new production paradigm 
might be emerging, one being pioneered by leading companies in industries as diverse as 
finance, semiconductors and pharmaceuticals. It appears to differ from mass production 
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which is essentially supply push and where significantly lower costs create their own 
demand. It also appears to differ from lean production which is more demand pull but with 
even lower costs than mass production, especially in terms of defects and inventories. 
We have called it "controlled" production because the firms using it seem to have 
organized themselves to access the information necessary to monitor and control all 
aspects of their business and to then act upon it competitively as a firm. This appears to be 
what Merck does in their approach to R&D, clinical trials, manufacturing, marketing, sales 
and after-sales support. Data gathering and control have in turn established several 
beneficial loops which seem to be self-reinforcing and which directly improve costs, 
quality and competitive position. This case should therefore be closely examined in this 
light. Furthermore, to the extent this does represent an important new development, the 
study team hopes other researchers will examine other leading firms in using information 
technology in their areas of interest to gather further evidence. This is because the 
competitive implications for both those using these techniques as well as those who are 
falling behind could have an impact that goes beyond a single industry such as autos. 
Rather like mass and lean product did in their time as their use spread to other industries, 
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